Scope of the Problem: fact-check checklist.

Antimony "+2,600%" — sourced, but rests on an implausible base price

Source: OilPrice.com (Jun 23, 2026): "the price went from $1,400/t to $38,000/t — a 2,600% spike." So the figure is now citable. Caveat: the $1,400/t base is not a real antimony metal price — antimony traded ~$12,000–13,000/t before the Aug 2024 controls, and other outlets measured the move at ~+200% (Geopolitical Monitor). Against a realistic pre-ban base, $38,000/t is roughly +200–300%, not +2,600%; the 27× headline depends entirely on the low $1,400 starting point.

Fix: if using +2,600%, cite OilPrice and footnote the $1,400→$38,000 basis; or use the conservative ~+200–300% against the ~$12–13k pre-ban price. Do not present +2,600% as unqualified.

Five-mineral chart: dollar values are correct, but they are OUTPUT, not GDP

Resolved (values): Antimony $544B, Gallium $602B, Zirconium $700B, Graphite $816B, Arsenic $1,076B (>$1T) all match Manley et al. (2022), Resources Policy 78, Table 1 exactly (USGS authors; 56 commodities → 182 industries; 30% one-year disruption). Arsenic >$1T is real.

Still to fix: (1) Manley's figures are economy-wide OUTPUT decline (gross output), not GDP — the chart title correctly says "output," but the section says "12.5% decline in GDP" and the callout says "% of GDP." Output ≠ GDP. (2) Arsenic is the largest only among the five selected minerals; in Manley's full table Mica ($1,783B), Lithium ($1,329B), Fluorspar, Titanium and Zinc all rank higher — the chart is a curated China-exposed subset, not the top five. (3) The "12.5%" appears to be the five minerals' output-% summed (1.9+2.1+2.4+2.8+3.7≈12.9%), which double-counts overlapping industries and is an output share, not GDP.

Fix: cite Manley 2022 explicitly; relabel "GDP" as "economy-wide output"; frame the five as "selected China-exposed minerals"; drop or heavily caveat the summed "12.5%." (Separately, the 2025 USGS OFR 2025–1047 ranks arsenic low on probability-weighted risk — different method; note both.)

China investment $523B — reconciled as a composite ($403B + $120B)

Resolved: the $523B is a sum of two sourced figures — $403.74B channeled into mining & infrastructure worldwide 2000–2023 (INSS, citing AidData's China Global Development Finance Dataset v3.0) + $120B since 2023 (Climate Energy Finance, Raw Power, Mar 2026). $403B + $120B ≈ $523B. This also explains the earlier $98B mismatch: that was AidData's narrow transition-minerals subset, whereas $403B is the full mining + infrastructure dataset.

Caveat (not a blocker): the composite blends two datasets with different scopes and a 2023 seam, and the $403B includes infrastructure, not only mineral mining. Footnote it as "mining & related infrastructure, AidData GCDF v3.0 (2000–23) + CEF (since 2023)," and attribute $120B to CEF rather than AidData.

"$6.2T ... roughly 15% of U.S. GDP"

The $6.2T "across all 60 minerals & 182 industries" builds on Manley 2022 (whose figures are gross output, and whose universe is 56 commodities / 182 industries — not 60). Calling it "15% of GDP" mislabels output as GDP: $6.2T is ~21% of 2025 GDP (~$29–30T), or ~13–15% of gross output (~$46T). The % only works against gross output, not GDP.

Fix: relabel as "economy-wide output" not GDP; correct "60 minerals" to Manley's 56 (or define the 60-basket); and show the derivation of $6.2T (it is not a straight sum of Table 1, which would far exceed it).

">$20T equity losses (~25% of total)"

Claimed: >$20T equity market-cap loss = ~25% of total. Total U.S. equity market cap is ~$55–62T (2025), so $20T is ~32–36%, not 25%. For $20T to equal 25%, the base would need to be ~$80T.

Fix: state the market-cap base and date, and reconcile the dollar and the percentage (either ~$14–15T at 25%, or ~33% at $20T).

China processing/refining share: 85% vs >70%

Section II says China holds 85% of "global processing & refining"; Section III·c says >70% of "global refining capacity." Two different numbers for the same concept on one page. (Rare-earth refining specifically is ~91%, which is separately cited and fine.)

Fix: choose one figure for all-critical-mineral refining, cite it (IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook), and keep the 91% strictly for rare earths.

100%-import-dependent count: 13 vs 12 vs 15

This page says 13/60 minerals are 100% import-dependent. The SMR facility brief says 12. USGS MCS 2025 reports the U.S. was 100% net import-reliant for 15 minerals in 2024 (12 in 2023). Three different numbers in play.

Fix: standardize on USGS MCS (state the year), and align this page with the SMR brief so AeX documents don't contradict each other.

The "/60" denominator

"13/60", "30/60", "all 60 minerals" all use a 60-mineral universe. The USGS Critical Minerals List is 50 (2022) / 54 (2025); DOE's critical-materials list differs again. No standard list contains 60.

Fix: define the 60-item basket explicitly (which list, which year) or switch to the USGS 50/54 denominator with a citation.

"29 more exceed 50% import reliance"

The 29 may be conflating two USGS figures: (a) minerals with >50% import reliance (~28 critical + 18 other in MCS 2025), and (b) the 29 mineral commodities the U.S. imported from China (2020–2023). These are different measures.

Fix: confirm which USGS measure "29" refers to and relabel accordingly.

Yttrium "+14,000%" (140×) — confirmed

Confirmed: yttrium oxide outside China rose ×140 since China's April 2025 controls (Argus data via Reuters, cited by The Oregon Group, Jun 2026; matches Nikkei "up 140-fold in 1 year") — hitting ~$1,100/kg by May 2026 from single digits. The earlier ~4,400% variant was an earlier-2025 snapshot; the 140× (May 2026) figure is current. This also confirms the Section V dysprosium/terbium ×4–×5 claim.

Action: footnote the source (Argus/Reuters via Oregon Group), the market (ex-China), and the window (since Apr 2025). No number change.

"88% contain ≥1 Chinese vendor" — label

Govini's 88% describes the share of ~43,000 supply chains influenced by China, not the share of weapon systems containing a Chinese vendor. The 77.7%, 1,900+ platforms, and 43,000 supply chains are accurate; the 88% is attached to the wrong subject.

Fix: relabel 88% as "of exposed supply chains are China-influenced (Govini)."

"68% of worldwide critical mineral production" (China)

IEA figures put China at ~60% of rare-earth mined output; an aggregate "68% of all critical-mineral production" is higher than typical mine-production shares and needs a specific source.

Fix: cite the exact IEA/USGS table and basket, or qualify as "production of [named] minerals."

"293 new major mines by 2035 · 110 in development"

The widely-cited Benchmark figure is 293 mines by 2030 (or 384 by 2035); the "by 2035" year and the 110-in-development / 183-missing split (internally consistent: 293−110=183) could not be confirmed against S&P.

Fix: confirm the source, year, and the 110/183 split. (Note: the 29-yr U.S. vs ~15-yr global discovery-to-production figures are supported by S&P.)

">80% of needs met by imports" & "<2% of global mining through 2030"

USGS frames reliance as counts of minerals, not a single aggregate ">80% of needs." The "<2% U.S. share of global mining capacity through 2030" also lacks a locatable source.

Fix: attach a primary citation for each, or restate in USGS's own terms (mineral counts).

Export-control timeline labels

"Antimony controls Sep 2024" (announced Aug 15, 2024 / effective Sep 15 — the SMR brief says "Aug 15, 2024"); "Unified Export Control Law Dec 2024" (name/date needs checking — China's unified dual-use regime took effect Dec 1, 2025); "Heavy rare earths Apr 2025 · permanent" (Apr 2025 additions confirmed; "permanent" is an editorial gloss).

Fix: align dates with the SMR brief and verify each label against the original Chinese MOFCOM announcements.

91% rare-earth processing/refining (China)

Confirmed — IEA reports China at ~91% of refined rare-earth output.

77.7% weapon systems · 1,900+ platforms · 43,000 supply chains

Confirmed — Govini "From Rock to Rocket" (2025). Five minerals per Govini: antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten, tellurium (note the page's platform lists name additional elements).

29 yrs (U.S.) vs ~15 yrs (global) discovery-to-production

Confirmed — S&P Global (2024): the U.S. ranks near-last on mine development time (~29 yrs) vs a ~16-yr global average.

Demand triple by 2030 / quadruple by 2040 · lithium 5×+

Broadly IEA-consistent (NZE: ~triple by 2030, quadruple by 2040; lithium up to ~9×). Caveat: the page's "modest 3% GDP growth" scenario is not an IEA scenario label (IEA uses STEPS/APS/NZE) — reword the framing.

Copper ~7× since 2001

Reasonable — copper ~$1,500–1,800/t (2001–03) to ~$10,000–11,000/t at 2024–25 peak ≈ 6–7×. Hold, but cite the exact endpoints.

$5.2T "structural value" & $10T corporate credit

These are AeX meta-analysis outputs, not externally verifiable. Not wrong — but must be labeled clearly as AeX estimates, not sourced facts, wherever shown.